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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 14-4590 
________________ 
 
VEGAS GIBSON, 
            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUPERINTENDENT DALLAS SCI; 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF DAUPHIN COUNTY 
 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D. C. Civil No. 1-12-cv-02443) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane  
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 on February 12, 2016 
 
Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 30, 2016) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
  Vegas Gibson appeals the District Court’s denial of his petition for writ of 
habeas corpus, challenging his July 2005 conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  We conclude that Gibson has not demonstrated that counsel was ineffective 
and therefore we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
I. 
 Gibson is an inmate at State Correctional Institute in Dallas, Pennsylvania, serving 
a life sentence for first-degree murder, aggravated assault, firearm possession and 
reckless endangerment.  Following his conviction, Gibson filed a petition for post-
conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to 
Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).  The PCRA court denied Gibson’s 
petition and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the PCRA court’s ruling.  Gibson 
then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which denied the petition.  
Gibson’s present appeal asserts three grounds upon which the lower courts should have 
found ineffective assistance of counsel.1  We review Gibson’s claims de novo.2 
II. 
 To demonstrate that counsel was ineffective, Gibson must establish that “counsel 
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 
                                              
1 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
2 Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 191 (3d Cir. 2000).  
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defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”3 
The Supreme Court in Strickland cautioned that “[b]ecause of the difficulties inherent in 
making the evaluation [of effectiveness of counsel], a court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance”; therefore “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 
deferential.”4  Where, as here, we review proceedings from a state court, “[t]he pivotal 
question is whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was 
unreasonable.”5   
 Gibson first alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to 
certain closing statements by the prosecution.  During closing arguments in Gibson’s 
trial, the prosecutor stated, “the first time you heard even a word about self-defense with 
respect to Gibson was this afternoon . . . . Four and a half days into the trial, Vegas 
Gibson gets on the stand.  That is when we hear self-defense.”  Gibson claimed these 
statements improperly relied on his post-arrest silence, in violation of Doyle v. Ohio.6  
Gibson previously raised this argument before the PCRA court, the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court and the District Court, all of which found no error given that the 
                                              
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984). 
4 Id. at 689.   
5 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (“A state court must be granted a 
deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves review under the 
Strickland standard itself.”).  
6 426 U.S. 610, 618-19 (1976) (“[I]t would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of 
due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation 
subsequently offered at trial.”). 
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prosecutor did not mention Gibson’s post-arrest conduct, but rather simply referred to his 
conduct at trial.   We agree that the prosecutor’s comments were an allowable response to 
Gibson’s conduct at trial and therefore his counsel was not ineffective for failing to object 
to them.  
 Gibson also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective on two grounds related to 
Jason Brown, a witness critical to Gibson’s self-defense argument.  At trial, Gibson’s 
self-defense claim was predicated in part on the actions of Brown, whom Gibson believed 
to be “exceptionally dangerous.”  Gibson claims that his counsel was ineffective in 
failing to discover that criminal charges had been filed against Brown.  The PCRA court 
addressed this issue and found that because the charges against Brown had been 
dismissed for lack of evidence, there was no basis for bringing those charges to the jury’s 
attention.  Furthermore, the PCRA court concluded that Gibson’s counsel was able to 
elicit testimony at trial showing that Brown had been involved in violent crimes in the 
past, which supported Gibson’s self-defense claim.  We therefore agree that Gibson has 
not shown that he was prejudiced by any failure to discover that criminal charges had 
been filed against Brown.   
 Additionally, Gibson argues that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the 
trial court’s exclusion of his proposed testimony about Brown’s violent character.  The 
Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed with Gibson that the testimony in question was 
offered to establish Gibson’s state of mind, rather than the truth of the matter asserted, 
and therefore held that the trial court erred in finding the testimony inadmissible hearsay.  
However, the Superior Court also concluded that because the jury did hear evidence 
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about “instances in which [Gibson] personally observed Brown commit acts of violence 
and other witnesses testified at [Gibson’s] trial about violent episodes in which Brown 
was involved,” the excluded evidence was merely cumulative.  We agree with the District 
Court’s holding that Gibson has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s 
failure to object to the trial court’s exclusion of his testimony.    
 Gibson has failed to demonstrate that the PCRA court’s ruling was unreasonable 
in its application of Strickland.  We will therefore affirm the judgment of the District 
Court.   
